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If it is a matter of common experience that there is something uncanny 
about dreams, this is more than usually true for narratologists. From a 
narrative point of view, dreaming in itself is both familiar and alien: on 
the one hand the virtuality of dream experience has long been invoked 
as the archetypal instance of immersion in a fi ction; on the other hand, 
this same sense of dreaming as hallucinatory experience would seem to 
disqualify it from consideration as narrative at all.
The ambiguous status of dreaming, as experience or as narrative, 
is the starting point for the argument of this chapter, which has two 
stages. The fi rst is to make the case for viewing dreams as narrative; the 
second is to show that if you accept the narrative view of dreams, there 
are far-reaching consequences for narrative theory. Of course the need 
to confront these consequences does not arise if you are unpersuaded 
by the fi rst stage of the argument, and my fear is that the narrative view 
of dreams may encounter resistance on the grounds, precisely, that the 
consequences are unacceptable. But it is a tautological way of thinking 
that defi nes its theoretical objects as only those things that fi t the the-
ory. I have sought to overcome this resistance (this dream censorship, if 
you like) by considering the merit of a narrative view of dreams, in the 
fi rst instance, without regard to consequences.
Daniel Dennett has made a provocative case against the “received 
view” that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, from the 
perspective of an intentional theory of mind; but his argument ulti-
mately focuses upon the hazy boundaries of what counts as experience 
rather than any sense that dreams are narrative representations. Den-
nett distinguishes three components of dreaming implied by an expe-
riential model: a (normally unconscious) process of composition; the 
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presentation of the dream (to the experiencing mind); and its recording 
(in memory, for possible later recollection). The fi rst and third of these, 
he suggests, may suffi ciently account for dreaming without the second, 
in which case the sense of dream experience is not in fact primary but 
the retrospective product of a memory trace. That is to say, though he 
doesn’t do so explicitly, the sense of dream experience is a product of 
narrative representation (1981: 132– 137). Dennett’s approach confl ates 
an argument against the idea of dreams as (hallucinatory) experience 
with one against there being any such thing as experiencing a dream. 
The latter argument seems unwarranted, and indeed disconfi rmed by 
more recent dream research, most obviously by research on lucid (self-
aware) dreaming. Dennett accommodates lucid dreams as follows: “Al-
though the composition and recording processes are entirely uncon-
scious, on occasion the composition process inserts traces of itself into 
the recording via the literary conceit of a dream within a dream” (138). 
On the face of it this is a plausible move, but in fact it doesn’t capture the 
specifi c quality of lucid dreams at all: it says, in effect, that you weren’t 
really aware that you were dreaming—you just dreamed that you were. I 
shall return to lucid dreams, and some of the research results that con-
fl ict with Dennett’s account, later in this chapter; but for now I want to 
suggest that a modifi ed version of his argument remains useful for the 
purpose in hand. Rather than treating the memory trace of a dream 
globally, as a narrative product only experienced retrospectively (on 
waking), we can conceive of it as a narrative process, the experience of 
which is ongoing and recursive for the dreamer. Experiencing a dream, 
in that case, is experiencing a narrative process: a reciprocal process of 
creation and reception.
The narrative view of dreams requires a representational discourse: 
Manfred Jahn, reviewing the status of dreams in response to a ques-
tion raised by Gerald Prince, comments that “hallucinatory perception, 
like real perception, cannot be (a) narrative. However, if Freud is right 
and dreams are the product of a fi ction-creating ‘dreamwork’ device, 
then they are based on a multimedial mode of composition much like 
that of fi lm” (Herman, Jahn, and Ryan 2005: 126). The appeal to Freud 
here is perhaps unnecessary, the notion of a dreamwork being the least 
specifi cally Freudian element of his theory of dreams; and if we confi ne 
ourselves to the aspect of the dreamwork he labels “secondary revision” 
(that is to say, the effort to impose order and coherence upon the dream 
materials), then it doesn’t even presuppose the necessary existence of 
unconscious “dream thoughts” as the obliquely articulated content of 
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Dreaming and Narrative Theory 143
the dream (Freud 1976: 628– 651). The narrative view of dreams I want 
to present is broadly based, and while it can accommodate a Freudian 
interpretation of the source of dream materials, it does not depend upon 
any such interpretation. The notion of the dreamwork is helpful, and 
I shall return to it; but the narrative approach is better founded upon 
an appeal to the work being done on dreams within the context of the 
cognitive sciences.
The main lines of debate in dream research over the last few decades 
have been structured around a confrontation between psychological 
accounts grounded upon mental functions and physiological accounts 
grounded upon brain chemistry. The debate has been as much about 
the questions worth asking (and the research worth funding) as the na-
ture of dreaming itself; many points of apparently intractable difference 
might equally be regarded as complementary, and indeed there has been 
a signifi cant convergence of views on several key issues in recent years. 
Representative of the psychological perspective is David Foulkes, for 
whom dreaming is the operation of refl ective consciousness in sleep; a 
champion of the physiological perspective is J. Allan Hobson, for whom 
dreaming is best referred, on an activation-synthesis model, to sleep-
ing brain states (Foulkes 1999; Hobson 2002). For the purposes of my 
argument here, it is worth noting that dreaming according to Foulkes 
is defi nitionally representational and narrative rather than experien-
tial, because it corresponds to our waking consciousness of our experi-
ence, not to that experience itself (1999: 3). Dreaming is not reducible 
to stimulus-response because it is creative; it is an aspect of our “refl ec-
tive ability to think in images” (15). He argues accordingly for a cogni-
tive equivalence between dreams and memories—or, more specifi cally, 
“conscious episodic recollection” (145).
Hobson, on the other hand, places much more emphasis upon the 
dissociation of dreaming from waking consciousness, and particularly 
the cognitive defi ciencies associated with dreaming: “diminished self-
awareness, diminished reality testing, poor memory, defective logic . . . 
inability to maintain directed thought” (2002: 111). These features, he 
argues, correlate with distinctive states of various regions of the brain 
during REM and non-REM sleep, as revealed by brain imaging (108– 
115). Hobson’s emphasis upon the chemically distinct conditions of 
dream consciousness supports his analogy between dreaming and de-
lirium (101), but the analogy does not ultimately resolve into a theory of 
dreaming as hallucinated experience. This is because the brain activa-
tion element of the theory is necessarily complemented by an element 
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of synthesis, which explains how the hallucinatory and emotional ef-
fects of brain activation are integrated in a more or less coherent, novel, 
and personally meaningful way (47). Hobson is cautious about using the 
word narration because he equates it with language and therefore with 
dream reports, whereas “dreams themselves are experienced more like 
fi lms. They are multimedia events, including fi ctitious movement. . . . 
Thus, we use the term ‘narration’ advisedly to signal the coherence of 
dream experience, which is all the more remarkable given the apparent 
chaos of REM sleep dreaming” (146– 147). This is indeed (multi media) 
narration, however, and the usage is supported by another descriptive 
term that Hobson offers as central to the dream-delirium analogy, 
which is confabulation—the psychiatric term for the fabrication of imagi-
nary events as compensation for a loss of memory (101).
Both Foulkes and Hobson defi ne their object of study in terms of the 
formal features of the process, dreaming, rather than the content analy-
sis of the product, dreams. Both are careful to disentangle the features 
of dreaming from those of sleep, and REM sleep in particular, and in 
considering the evolutionary role of dreams, both allow that they may 
be merely epiphenomenal. REM sleep itself is evidently essential to life 
in mammals, but for Foulkes dreaming emerges too late, phylogeneti-
cally and ontogenetically, to be integral to the basic adaptive functions 
of sleep, and is probably an incidental by-product of the intersection of 
two phenomena which are themselves clearly adaptive, consciousness 
and internally generated cortical activation in sleep (1999: 137– 141). For 
Hobson the brain activity associated with dreaming is adaptive, serv-
ing to reorder and update our memory systems, irrespective of dream 
recall, which may simply result from the circumstantial intrusion of this 
process into consciousness (2002: 87– 88). These considerations do not 
exclude the possibility that there are cognitive benefi ts to dreaming, or 
indeed that any such benefi ts may be closely related to narrative compe-
tence (I’ll return to this idea later). Without prejudice to such possibili-
ties, though, the narrative view of dreams can be further consolidated 
by noting that both Foulkes and Hobson introduce the role of cogni-
tive processing rather late in their accounts. They appear to confi ne 
the cognitive dimension of dreaming to refl ective consciousness about 
dream phenomena, or to a synthetic role in the integration of such phe-
nomena. Yet inasmuch as a dream element is recognizable at all (a cigar, 
say, rather than just a pattern of light), it is not merely phenomenal but 
perceptual, and already a cognitive product. This is true of all percepts, 
of course, whatever the phenomenal stimulus, so it doesn’t in itself mark 
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Dreaming and Narrative Theory 145
any departure from the realm of experience. The essential difference 
arises with the possibility that the perceptual apparatus may function 
semiotically, as a representational medium.
I take my semiotic frame of reference from C. S. Peirce, although 
there is some ambiguity as to whether Peirce himself regarded percepts 
as fully semiotic, partly because there is a discernible change in his 
thinking on this point between earlier and later writings, and partly be-
cause his usage of the term percept appears to be inconsistent (Bergman). 
He distinguishes the percept from, on the one hand, the “phaneron” or 
sensory phenomenon, and on the other, the perceptual judgment; the 
percept as interpreted in perceptual judgment he designates as the “per-
cipuum.” However, the percept is known only as mediated by perceptual 
judgment, and Peirce seems sometimes to use the term percept to refer 
to the complex as a whole (Bergman 17– 18). In this broader sense the 
percept is fully semiotic: representational, intentional, and communica-
tive (to the future self). It has been argued that even in the narrow sense 
the percept should be understood as an iconic sign (Ransdell 1986), 
but that is incidental here because the internally generated percepts of 
dreams are necessarily percepts under the interpretation of perceptual 
judgment, which is in effect the base level of the process Freud called 
“secondary revision.”
One aspect of the iconicity of percepts that merits further comment, 
though, is their place within the evolutionary hierarchy of signs favored 
by (for example) Terrence Deacon. In the evolutionary model, the icon 
(of which the percept is the paradigm) is the most primitive kind of sign, 
characterized by a present relation of similarity to its referent; the index 
still involves a present relation, but is merely associative, as in a condi-
tioned response; whereas only the symbol proper, product of a sign system, 
functions in an absent relation to its referent (Deacon 1997). The hallu-
cinatory percepts of dreams, however, do indeed function in the absence 
of their referents: they are generated, once we get beyond the initial 
stimulus of unspecifi ed brain activity, out of the cognitive repertoire of 
mental imagery upon which the dreamer draws in the sense-making ef-
fort Freud called secondary revision, which is—to reiterate—an integral 
part of the dream formation. The “secondariness” of secondary revision 
is relative to a Freudian primary process of “dream thought” represen-
tation; the distinction is muddied somewhat, though, by Freud’s occa-
sional application of the term to a further stage of revision at the point 
of reporting the dream (1976: 658– 659). Similarly, the narrative status 
of dreams is obscured in much psychological writing on the subject by 
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the standard methodological distinction between the dream experience 
and the retrospective, narrative dream report (cf. Hobson’s reservations 
above). Nonetheless, all dreams are post- cognitive productions: that is 
to say, all dreams we are in principle capable of recalling, granted that 
this is not the sum of measurable brain activity during sleep—but that 
means all dreams, in the generally accepted sense of the word. In this 
respect, as Foulkes argues, they are directly comparable to memories, 
which draw upon the same resources of mental imagery. The apparently 
qualitative difference in the experiential characteristics of the two—the 
evanescence of memory versus the perceptual intensity of dreams—can 
be seen as a difference of degree, not kind: the mental imagery of most 
dreams is more vivid than that of most memories because any inhibit-
ing awareness of our actual somatic sensory environment is radically at-
tenuated in sleep. As cognitive applications of mental imagery, dreams 
and memories are discourse; and most of the dreams of most dreamers 
are narrative, just as episodic memories are narrative, by which I mean 
simply that they represent discrete temporal experiences: they articu-
late human time. Accordingly, the element of dream formation that I 
have until now referred to using Freud’s term, “secondary revision,” can 
be redescribed, if with some avowed over-generality, as the process of 
narration.
The salient difference in kind between a memory and a dream is 
not that one is true and the other is false: there is such a thing as false 
memory, and dreams may represent actual experiences, without detract-
ing from the integrity of either mental activity. The difference is that 
the generative principles of each are antithetical in a crucial respect: 
the dominant cognitive imperative of memory is its representational 
adequacy to prior experiential fact, however much that imperative may 
be co-opted by subjective interests in the particular case; whereas the 
dominant cognitive imperative of dreaming, however much it may in-
volve representations of prior experience, is the satisfaction of present 
mental needs (some very obvious and general, such as the expression of 
desires or the management of anxieties, others rather more obscure or 
circumstantial). These cognitive drivers, I suggest, are of complemen-
tary rhetorical kinds: that is to say, the fundamental distinction between 
dreams and memories is not between falsehood and truth, still less be-
tween illusion and experience, but between fi ction and non-fi ction.
Perception is a representation of the world: that is, experience, but it 
is also the foundation of the cognitive narrative faculty, the products of 
which are available to (episodic) memory. The salient feature of dream 
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Dreaming and Narrative Theory 147
percepts is that they are fi ctive representations, and that of dreams is 
that they are fi ctive narratives. These four concepts and three qualities 
intersect as in Figure 6.1: percepts are representational, but not fi ctive 
and not narrative; memories are representational and narrative, but not 
fi ctive; dream percepts are representational and fi ctive, but not narra-
tive; dreams are representational, fi ctive, and narrative.
Where is the self in this narrative view of dreaming? There appears 
to be a tension between the “I” who experiences and participates in 
dream events and the “I” who produces the dream. But it is important 
to recognize, fi rst of all, that the experiential “I” of dreams, whether as 
agent or witness, is itself part of the dream, a product of the process of 
dream formation or narration, and a contingent part at that, since there 
are dreams that include no self-representation. Second, and in general, 
the self is the subject as object: there is a refl exiveness inherent in the 
concept that explains why it is impossible for the subject to be entirely 
present to itself, for that would exclude any position from which, and to 
which, to present itself. Even a minimal sense of self involves refl ective 
consciousness, which involves some displacement of the subject. Dreams 
are by the subject and for the subject, with the same ongoing reciprocity 
as waking thought; and they are of course always in some sense about or 
of the subject, if not always representationally of the self. The percep-
tual rather than conceptual nature of self-representation in dreams does 
Figure 6.1.
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not amount to the primacy of experience, therefore: it is simply inherent 
in the fact that the medium of dreams is the perceptual system itself.
There is another sense in which refl ective consciousness is at play 
in dreams, which is that normally associated with lucid dreaming. The 
essence of a lucid dream is the dreamer’s awareness that it is a dream, a 
representational use of the perceptual system rather than an attempt to 
assimilate primary phenomenal data. It may follow from such awareness 
that it becomes possible to consciously direct the course of the dream, 
and so lucid dreaming is often understood to include this feature as 
well. The ability to recognize that one is dreaming can be cultivated, 
and this has made possible extensive long-term studies of lucid dream 
experience under laboratory conditions (LaBerge and DeGracia 2000). 
This research confi rms that “lucidity in dreams is not a discrete phe-
nomenon, but that refl ective consciousness exists in all dreams and can 
be measured on a continuum with ‘lucidity’ and ‘non-lucidity’ repre-
senting two ends of the spectrum” (2000: 269– 270). Three components 
of the lucid dream context may be distinguished, as follows: a metacog-
nitive context, which is refl ective consciousness itself; a semantic con-
text, which is the framework of knowledge and belief within which the 
dream experience is understood; and a goal-option framework within 
which intentional action becomes possible. Metacognition can occur in 
all dreams, but whereas in most dreams it is articulated with reference 
to the dream context itself, in lucid dreams proper it includes waking 
contexts as well, providing for an awareness of contrasts between the 
two (274– 275). Even the latter form of metacognition is not wholly ex-
clusive to lucid dreams, however: a tacit awareness of such contrasts is 
a general feature of dream experience, being latent, for example, in the 
sense of strangeness that accompanies many dreams.
The semantic context of lucid dreaming determines the scope of re-
sponse on the dreamer’s part. Straightforwardly, this amounts to the ge-
neric expectations invoked by the recognition, “this is a dream,” though 
it may be assimilated within different generic frames of reference, such 
as “out-of-body experience” or “astral projection” (275). Such alternative 
ways of conceptualizing the experience bring with them different expec-
tations, and so tend to inhibit or privilege different kinds of represented 
action. But this is also true, of course, for different senses of what “this 
is a dream” might imply. Most narratologists, I’m sure, are aware that 
they tend to have narratologists’ dreams; and lucid dream researchers 
are similarly infl uenced by their own preconceptions. The kinds of in-
tentional action emphasized in lucid dream research are clearly oriented 
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Dreaming and Narrative Theory 149
toward the context of the laboratory-based study of lucid dreams: they 
frame the general goal-option context in terms of voluntary choices of 
action within the dream environment, with particular emphasis upon 
deliberate metacognitive checking of state of consciousness (i.e., tech-
niques for consolidating and sustaining lucidity), and the recall and 
performance of pre-planned actions in order to further experimental 
objectives (276, 282). These latter actions include, for example, making 
emphatic upward glances, a signal designed to exploit the laboratory ap-
paratus for monitoring REM sleep as a channel of communication; and 
counting to ten between upward glances, in order to make a verifi able 
estimate of the passage of time within the dream. (The effectiveness of 
these strategies is unclear: certainly the eye movements during REM 
sleep do not generally map well onto dream content.)
It might seem that, in principle, the onset of lucidity in a dream 
should make anything possible. In fact it has proved far easier, at least 
within the context of these experimental assumptions, to exercise con-
trol over the represented self—even beyond the limitations of natural 
laws—than to consciously affect the dream environment. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the creative freedom of the lucid dreamer should be 
so circumscribed, however, for several reasons. The fi rst, as I have al-
ready suggested, is that the semantic context within which dreaming is 
conceptualized has parameters of its own—for example, a tendency to 
discriminate sharply between the experiential self of the dream and the 
dream environment. The second (which is in part a pragmatic justifi ca-
tion for the fi rst) is that the precondition of lucidity is refl exivity, and it 
is therefore best sustained by focusing upon the dream self as the rep-
resentational embodiment of that refl exivity. Third, the precondition 
of any narrative dream whatever is some degree of coherence and con-
tinuity, a cognitive effort which necessarily draws upon the cognitive 
contexts of waking life. And fi nally, there is a curious double relation 
between lucidity and immersion which is worth closer consideration.
Metacognitive awareness of the dream state is justifi ably associated 
with a degree of detachment from the perceptual-cognitive experience. 
Indeed, the need to control and contain overwhelming experiences of 
fear or anxiety, for example, is one of the commonest reasons for the on-
set of lucidity: it’s all right, it’s only a dream. And although lucid dream 
experiments have proved that “some sensory experiences are well mod-
elled by the brain in the absence of primary sensory input” and can be 
voluntarily induced, the sensation of pain in particular is much less ac-
cessible (296). In this respect, lucidity appears to be a defense against the 
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risks of immersion in a dream, allowing the dreamer to hold it at arm’s 
length and keep out of harm’s way. On the other hand, lucidity strongly 
correlates with immersion in the sense of a participatory involvement 
in the dream environment, rather than detached observation of it—or 
in narratological terms, homodiegesis rather than heterodiegesis. Simi-
larly, the perceptual environment of dreams in general may range from 
minimal realization, in which sensory qualities are mostly absent or at-
tenuated, up to typical sensory perception and even beyond, to vibrantly 
psychedelic experiences: lucid dreams are typically at the higher end of 
the scale, appearing more perceptually vivid than other dreams, and ac-
companied correspondingly by relatively intense brain activation. A rea-
sonable inference from the association between lucidity and psychedelic 
dreams would be that lucid dreams, far from being more superfi cial and 
detached, often bring to perception deeper neurological processes than 
usual (285– 256). These confl icting views of the relation between lucidity 
and immersion suggest that the latter is a rather catch-all concept, and 
that it is important to distinguish between different senses of the term.
Immersion within a simulation, whether a physical environment, a 
technologically virtual analogue, or a mental model (a thought exper-
iment, say), is an experiential matter in the sense that it provides for 
agency, action, and reaction, within the limits defi ned by the param-
eters of the simulation. Specifi cally narrative immersion is generally un-
derstood as a special case of mental simulation, provided for by mimetic 
representation and necessarily constrained to a passive, receptive stance 
by the determinate nature of narrative. Note that this account of nar-
rative immersion concerns the consumption of narrative: narrative cre-
ativity, on the same basis, is understood as a prior, authorial run through 
the simulation, of which the narrative itself is the product or trace (see 
Ryan 2001: 110– 114). Dreams, it is worth insisting, are creative: but it 
is not plausible to defi ne that creativity as the tracing of a path through 
the preconceived parameters of a simulation. Dreams necessarily un-
fold within the terms of some situational premises, without which they 
would have no coherence or stability at all, but they are remarkable pre-
cisely for the fl uidity with which these parameters can change in the 
course of the ongoing dreamwork, and in accordance with ideas emer-
gent out of the representational particulars of that activity. Simulations 
and narratives are in a crucial sense antithetical, as ludologists insist: 
simulation is a top-down concept, a modeling of the logic and general 
laws defi ning an environment, whereas narrative representation unfolds 
as a bottom-up process, via particulars. Because dreams use the per-
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Dreaming and Narrative Theory 151
ceptual system as their medium of articulation, they lend themselves 
to the assumption that they conform to, or even are paradigmatic of, 
an experiential concept of immersion in a virtual environment. But the 
perceptual system in this context is discursive and generative—its semi-
otic capacity harnessed creatively—so that the sense of immersion here 
is not experiential, but itself a semiotic product, and therefore in no way 
incompatible with the foregrounded awareness of artifi ce that consti-
tutes lucidity in dreams.
If there are good grounds for regarding dreams as narrative fi ctions, 
however, the implications of doing so are far-reaching for narrative the-
ory. Dreams elude many basic narratological assumptions, perhaps be-
cause of the peculiarity of their circumstances, or perhaps because these 
very circumstances bring them closer to the nub of the matter than 
other kinds of narrative. At the very least, narrative theory should be 
able to accommodate dreams; and it might do well to learn from them.
Fictionality
The fi ctionality of dreams in itself resists explanation in conventional 
narratological terms. Fictionality is treated, by both the pretense model 
of fi ctive discourse in speech act theory and the fi ctional worlds model 
of fi ctive reference, as fundamentally a problem of truthfulness. In the 
fi rst case fi ction is distinguished from seriously asserted narrative; in 
the second, it is distinguished from reference to the actual world. Yet 
it seems bizarre, on the one hand, to conceive of a dreamer pretend-
ing the dreamwork, or of dreaming as pretending to remember; and on 
the other hand the contingency of dream representations—their ad hoc 
fl uidity in response to the demands of the moment, however those may 
be understood—exposes rather starkly the cumbersome redundancy of 
a fi ctional worlds account of fi ctive reference. Dreams suggest a view of 
fi ctive communication that is not subordinate to directly assertive com-
munication at all, nor anchored by the assumption of a global referential 
ground, but rather accountable to generative principles of relevance or 
salience. I have characterized the difference between dreams and mem-
ories in terms of rhetorical orientation: while memories spring from 
and are accountable to a criterion of representational adequacy to ex-
periential fact, dreams have the same recursive relationship to the rep-
resentation of subjective signifi cance—to desires, anxieties, values; in 
short, to the realm of meaning. In the dream case then, the generative 
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principle of relevance is a criterion of accountability within the sphere 
of discourse; accountability to the expressive and cognitive needs of the 
dreamer as they emerge and evolve in terms of the narrative process in 
train. The dream case is the fi ctive case: with the appropriate substitu-
tion of terms the principle of relevance operates in the same way for 
fi ctive communication in general, just as it encompasses, via the rhetori-
cal antithesis I have outlined, the non-fi ctive, assertive communication 
against which fi ction is commonly defi ned. In the non-fi ctive case, the 
theoretical framework for such a rhetorical, pragmatic model of com-
munication has been extensively elaborated in terms of relevance theory 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995). Its implications for fi ction, though, have not 
been widely recognized. A serious consideration of dreaming forces this 
theoretical issue, I think, because it insists upon a direct relation be-
tween narrative fi ctionality and imagination, and the elemental status of 
the latter as a mental faculty.
Narrativity
It will be clear that while a narrative view of dreams provides for a prin-
cipled account of the (rhetorical) distinctiveness of their fi ctionality, it 
also insists upon the pervasiveness of narrativity as a feature of cognitive 
sense making. In particular, dreams foreground the sense of narrative 
representation as a process, and lend themselves to description in terms 
of, for example, Paul Ricoeur’s concept of mimesis as confi guration, a 
model which does indeed tend to encourage the equation of narrativ-
ity with panfi ctionality, as Ricoeur himself acknowledges (1984– 1988: 
1:267n1). But the ubiquity of narrative artifi ce is a consideration of a dif-
ferent order from the distinct pragmatic features of fi ctionality. Dreams 
exemplify most emphatically the way in which the general confi guring 
activity of mimesis in Ricoeur’s sense is performed, in the fi ctive case, 
only upon what the creative mind proposes to itself. It is not so much 
the application of a cognitive narrative faculty in order to make sense of 
certain particulars, as it is the conjuring of such particulars in the exer-
cise of such a faculty. The raw improvisatory quality of dreams strongly 
suggests a view of fi ctionality as characterized by just such a reciprocal 
interplay of narrative particulars and general narrative competence: as 
the serious-playful exercise of the narrative faculty, which is to say both 
its use and its development. Indeed such a notion of fi ction as a kind of 
cognitive exercise also has the merit of offering, without assuming, a 
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broadly plausible adaptive rationale for the phenomenon of dreaming: 
narrative creativity in the absence of empirical constraints enhances our 
capacity to assimilate novel phenomena.
Story and Discourse
The distinction between story and discourse, or fabula and sjuzet, com-
monly rests upon a view of story as event-sequence, despite the fact that 
there is nothing storylike about events in themselves. If story cannot be 
any kind of (narrative) representation, which is discourse, neither can it 
be something intrinsic in the phenomenal world. This has been pointed 
out by Marie-Laure Ryan, who offers instead a view of story as a mental 
image, a cognitive construct (Herman, Jahn, and Ryan 2005: 347). The 
distinction between story and discourse, then, rests only upon a dis-
tinction between material and mental representations. But as the case of 
dreams makes forcefully apparent, the media of mental representations, 
whether perceptual or linguistic, are as semiotic as material signs, and 
the representations themselves are as specifi c. Mental representation is 
indeed discourse, and entirely compatible with the narratological sense 
of the term. To insist upon a story-discourse distinction on such a basis, 
then, is to make it something quite other than the distinction we were 
taught to think of in terms of the “what” and “how” of narrative repre-
sentation. Dreaming, as an irreducibly cognitive instance of the fi ctive 
paradigm, insists that narrative discourse cannot be referred to an un-
derlying, conceptually prior story or fabula. The recursive nature of the 
dreamwork as a creative process, on the narrative view, suggests a better 
concept of story as a product of the generative-interpretative feedback 
loop, as something contingent and progressive, at close range to the 
process itself. On such an account, story does not ground discourse, but 
arises from it, as an ongoing narrative interpretant.
The Narrator
The concept of the narrator as a distinct narrative agent is also under-
mined by a narrative view of dreams. It is perhaps plausible to under-
stand some dreams as homodiegetic narration, that is to say as narrated 
by a self within the dream, but any such self is necessarily a representa-
tional product of dreaming consciousness like any other. Narration thus 
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conceived, then, is subordinate to representation, and in no way consti-
tutes a separate element of narrative transmission. More fundamentally, 
for those dreams without self-representation, there is no case for argu-
ing that the dreamer makes sense of the dream (either in process or ret-
rospectively) as the report of a distinct heterodiegetic narrator. Dreams 
are directly fi ctive and experienced directly, not framed as the discourse 
of a distinct agent for whom the events are known rather than imagined. 
Imagination, indeed, is precisely the relevant concept: it does not need 
to be redeemed by a dissociative framework providing for suspension 
of disbelief, willing or otherwise. Issues of belief and disbelief are not 
germane to the mind’s capacity for narrative elaboration in itself, and 
of limited importance to the affective salience of such narratives. The 
fact that dreams may be lucid in varying degrees, and still be dreams, 
requires us to think of fi ctive narration as an act that can be directly 
owned by the creative imagination without being confl ated with delu-
sion or (self) deception. Dream lucidity is not an elaborately contrived 
metafi ctional game, but a possibility latent in the ordinary conditions 
of dream consciousness; not a refl exive framing of the dreamwork (as a 
dream within a dream), but simply one of the available cognitive con-
texts within which it takes place.
Voice
Pursuing the communicative framework of dreams a little further, there 
is much to be gained from refl ecting upon the concept of voice in this 
context—both because the perceptual medium of dreams helps to off-
set the linguistic bias of the term voice, and because the interiority of 
dreams helps tease apart entangled senses of agency and selfhood in 
the concept. The dreaming subject is the agent of a narrative act that 
may itself include representation of the self as agent, and as a discursive 
agent (in the broadest sense), as well as representation of the discursive 
agency of others. Retroactively, the dream discourse also implies and 
constructs selfhood around the subject position being established in the 
act of narration, the dream situating the dreamer in the process of its 
own construction and reception—because dreams can change you. The 
dreamer’s internally dialogic relation to the dream, as both its producer 
and its consumer, foregrounds the dialogism of narrative discourse in 
general, but it also draws attention to the insuffi ciently recognized fact 
that such discourse does not only involve multiple voices, it involves 
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multiple senses of voice. Voice, in narrative theory, may refer to a repre-
sentational act (a narrative instance—the Genettian sense), a (discursive) 
object of representation (a represented idiom), or a representational sub-
ject position (in the perspectival or ideological sense the term acquires 
in, for example, feminist or Bakhtinian theory). The interplay between 
these crucially distinct features of narrative representation accounts for 
many of its subtlest effects, and theoretical discussion of such issues as 
free indirect discourse and focalization is much impaired by their con-
fl ation under a single term.
Medium
The medium of dream narrative is the cognitive-perceptual appara-
tus itself; narrative, on this view, is a cognitive sense-making faculty 
that proceeds from the outset in representational terms. Accordingly, 
there is no meaningful sense in which narrative can be thought of as 
medium-independent: no event, however minimal, is structured as such 
except in cognitive terms, and the same applies a fortiori for sequences 
of events. The possibility of remediation, or the transposition of nar-
ratives between media, is no grounds for attributing any abstract deep 
structure to narrative, since the sense of narrative sameness upon which 
that possibility depends requires cognitive articulation, and so is itself 
within the domain of mediation. The base level of mediation, then, is 
not the transmission of some already otherwise encoded meaning, but 
the inaugural articulation of meaning that is semiosis itself. Moreover, 
the semiotic nature of mental imagery carries inherent within it the 
possibility of metacognitive awareness, just as lucidity is latent in all 
dreams: the implication would seem to be that recursiveness is integral 
to sense making, and therefore that the formulaic reciprocity between 
the two views of narrative cognition formulated by David Herman—
making sense of stories and stories as sense making (2003: 12– 14)—is in 
fact irreducible to a hierarchical relation. Neither view can provide for 
a foundational concept of narrative within a cognitive paradigm. If the 
cognitive- perceptual apparatus itself is representational, narrative cog-
nition is always the medium-bound articulation of meaning (that is to 
say, concurrently the creation and expression of structures of meaning), 
the only ground for which must be pragmatic effi cacy within a given 
context. In the fi ctive case for which dreams stand as exemplar, then, 
the rhetorical direction of fi t between meaning and ground is reversed: 
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such contextual criteria of accountability are no longer the fi nal court 
of narrative, but its occasion, subject to the possibilities of imaginative 
elaboration and exploration, and qualifi ed or refi gured by that process.
Narrative Creativity
In dreams, narrative creativity and reception go hand in hand: “author-
ship” and “readership” are symbiotic. The narration proceeds in a con-
tinuously reciprocal relation with the dreamer’s own evaluative response 
to it, because this response is the only constraint upon it, and entirely 
defi nes the parameters of its accountability. The specifi c line of narrative 
development is a refl exive negotiation between the current dream state 
at any given moment and the cognitive context of the dreamer’s narra-
tive competence. But isn’t this the case for all fi ctions? Dreams present 
in naked form the interplay of the particular and the general that sup-
plies the fundamental logic of all narrative creativity, and not just in an 
external global sense, but intimately throughout the creative process. 
Authorship is itself a kind of readership, a process of discovery, in the 
particulars of a conceit, of the “right” narrative development, step by 
step, in the context of a general framework of narrative understanding. 
Such authorial discernment is successful to the extent that the narrative 
understanding it draws upon is collective; to the extent that the author 
belongs to a community of readership. The communication model of 
narrative transmission, on this view, is seriously misleading: the mean-
ing of a story is not conceived by the author, ab initio, to be transmit-
ted in narrative form to a reader who attempts to decode it. Author and 
reader approach the emergent possibilities of a narrative from the same 
side—the author a little in advance—and share in the achievement of an 
understanding that is itself, from start to fi nish, narrative in form.
Affective Response
Our understanding of affective response or emotional involvement with 
fi ctions is also called to account by a consideration of the directly fi c-
tive nature of dream narration, together with the reciprocity of creation 
and reception exemplifi ed by dreams. The affective power of dreams is 
not consequent upon an illusion of reality, nor upon an assumption of 
discursive truth, because it is an integral quality of the unfolding fi ctive 
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representation itself as it is assimilated and generated by the dreamer. 
One phenomenon supporting this view is the persistence of immersion 
within lucid dreams, and the fact that lucidity, while certainly constitut-
ing a redirection of the dreamer’s cognitive attention, by no means viti-
ates the emotional valency of dream representations. Or again, the dis-
cursive rather than experiential nature of the affective quality of dreams 
can be inferred from the common circumstance of a dream in which 
the mood is incongruous with the apparent narrative content. This dis-
crepancy is highlighted whenever a dream report—a summary of the 
events of the dream narrative—does not satisfy the dreamer’s own sense 
of its emotional force. It suggests that such affective qualities are not 
products of a discrete stage in the dreamer’s reception of the dream, but 
integral to the representational qualities of the dream discourse itself, 
and the feedback loop of narrative creativity and reception sustaining 
that discourse. In other words, emotional valency, or affective value in 
general, is inherent in the process of (narrative) representation, rather 
than a secondary response to the products of representation. If this is 
so, the various ways in which narrative theorists and philosophers have 
sought to reconcile emotional involvement with fi ctionality are miscon-
ceived and redundant. Affective response does not depend upon suspen-
sion of disbelief or any equivalent framing of our engagement with fi c-
tions because it is inherent in, and continuous with, the semiotic process 
of representation, and need not wait upon an assessment of the reality or 
truth of its products.
It is hard to see how dreaming can be understood as anything other 
than a narrative process; but if this is so, dreams present a challenge to 
narrative theory on several fronts. I don’t think this challenge can be 
minimized by regarding dreams as marginal phenomena, not only be-
cause they are a near universal feature of human consciousness and in-
timately tied up with our common intuitions about the narrative imagi-
nation, but also because they are inescapably key instances of (fi ctive) 
narrative cognition. The main thrust of my argument here has been to 
bring that cognitive frame of reference to bear upon narrative theory, 
but I hope it’s clear that there is also a great deal to be gained from ori-
enting our attention the other way. Narrative theory can bring a great 
deal to our understanding of cognition, provided only that it opens itself 
to the questions posed by that still enigmatic domain of inquiry.
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